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I
’m delighted to be here today to talk with you about the wave of bank merg-
ers that is sweeping across our country—our hometown included. While
Richmond had experienced some sizable ripples earlier, as we all know,
the really big wave last year and earlier this year left very few local institutions
in its wake. Many Richmonders are still adjusting to the loss of their banks and
to the new, North Carolina-based, ﬁnancial landscape. Residents of other U.S.
cities—including large, proud cities like Philadelphia and San Francisco—are
experiencing similar adjustments and emotions due to bank consolidations.
Turn back the calendar 28 years to see how times have changed. In 1970,
the year I began working at the Richmond Fed, the largest bank in the country—
the Bank of America with assets of $27 billion—was located in California;
Charlotte, North Carolina, was a not-particularly well-known Southern city on
the opposite coast. How many of us imagined then that Charlotte would later
be headquarters to one of the world’s largest banking companies, with assets of
almost $600 billion? By virtue of being home to NationsBank and First Union,
Charlotte has become a focal point of the rapid banking consolidation that is
now extending across the whole of the United States.
Banking consolidation is big news these days, with a new megamerger
announced almost monthly. The proposed Citicorp-Travelers union could
break new ground on banking-insurance combinations, and the NationsBank-
BankAmerica merger will produce a huge, truly national banking franchise.
With change of this magnitude, however, come concerns, and people are con-
cerned about a lot of things regarding these developments. They are concerned
about higher fees and lower levels of service. They are concerned about credit
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availability and disrupted banking relationships. In my remarks this morning
I want to address some of these concerns and what I believe are some of the
major forces behind these events.
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
To understand the developments I have just described, it is helpful to review
brieﬂy a bit of the history of American banking—particularly the history of
restrictions on bank branching. Turn back the calendar once again. In the early
years of the post–World War II period, strict and quite limiting branching re-
strictions were common throughout the United States. Obviously, consolidation
in banking could not occur until these restrictions were removed. The restric-
tions had two sources. The ﬁrst was a powerful sentiment that can be traced to
the earliest years of our nation’s history: a deep-seated distrust of large, cen-
tralized organizations—large ﬁnancial institutions in particular. Subsequently,
efforts to shield smaller banks by limiting competition from branches of larger
banks became a factor as well.
As you will recall from your American History courses, the fear of con-
centrated ﬁnancial structures became dramatically apparent during the early-
nineteenth-century debates over whether to renew the charters of the First and
Second Banks of the United States. Many were afraid that these large federal
institutions would concentrate ﬁnancial power and be used to beneﬁt their
owners at the expense of the broader public. As a result, neither charter was
renewed, and after the demise of the Second Bank in 1837, no comparable
replacement was chartered.
Despite these apprehensions, branching was not uncommon in the South
before the Civil War, and several Midwest banks had branches as well. But
there was little interest in establishing new branches following the war, since
the technology that would allow inexpensive long-distance communication had
yet to appear. Seeking approval from distant headquarters for local lending de-
cisions would have been prohibitively costly before the widespread availability
of the telephone. These communications costs argued for small, locally run
banks. As a consequence—and this will be a surprising statistic for many of
you—while there were approximately 13,000 banks in the United States at the
turn of the century, there were only 119 bank branches in the entire country.
In the last few years of the nineteenth century, advances in communications
technology stimulated new interest in branching. But with increased interest
came strong opposition, much of it from smaller banks and much of it success-
ful, which ultimately produced widespread branching restrictions at both the
federal and state levels.
One impediment to branching was the general belief that the National
Banking Act passed during the Civil War prohibited it. To remedy the sit-
uation, legislative proposals were offered in the late 1890s that would have   
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allowed national banks to branch, but these proposals met with fatal opposition
from several congressmen and the Comptroller of the Currency, who regulates
national banks, on the grounds that they would concentrate banking power. As
an alternative to branches, an act was passed in 1900 that lowered the minimum
capital necessary to form a new national bank in a small town. In response, the
number of banks almost doubled in the next ten years. The newcomers were
primarily small unit banks: that is, single-ofﬁce banks. These banks formed an
antibranching fraternity that slowed the spread of branch banking for decades.
From 1900 until the early 1920s, the Comptroller prohibited national bank
branching with few exceptions, and unit bankers lobbied successfully to contain
the spread of branching by state-chartered banks. At the annual convention of
the American Bankers Association in 1922, unit banks argued that “branch
banking concentrates the credits of the Nation and the power of money in the
hands of a few.” During the 1920s, a number of states, including Virginia, im-
posed signiﬁcant restrictions on the branching powers of state-chartered banks.
Importantly, though, a handful of states bucked the trend and passed fairly lib-
eral branching laws, among them notably—I could say prophetically—North
Carolina.
For all of the strength of antibranching sentiment in this period, the high
failure rate of unit banks throughout the 1920s and in the early years of the
Great Depression revealed quite starkly a signiﬁcant downside to branching re-
strictions: namely, the susceptibility of unit banks to runs generated by shocks
to their local, usually relatively undiversiﬁed loan portfolios. Failure rates for
the branching banks that existed were generally much lower, motivating some
policymakers to call for liberalized branching as a means of diversifying indi-
vidual bank portfolios and strengthening the banking system.
A number of states did liberalize their branching laws between 1929 and
1939. Further, in 1932 Senator Carter Glass, who as you know was one of the
founding fathers of the Federal Reserve, proposed enhanced branching powers
for national banks to allow both statewide and limited interstate branching.
The momentum of this trend, however, was largely undercut early on by the
passage of national deposit insurance in 1933, which guaranteed the stability
of the banking system via an alternative route. Insurance allowed branching
restrictions to continue with relatively marginal changes from the end of the
Depression until the 1980s. During that 50-year period, the number of bank
mergers was relatively modest: generally between 75 and 150 per year.
Since 1981, however, merger activity has exploded, with close to 600 merg-
ers occurring in 1997 alone. Over this same period the opposition to branching
that was so robust in the preceding 100-plus years eroded, and restrictions on
branching collapsed in three steps. First, during the 1980s, 20 states, including
Virginia, liberalized in-state branching laws. By 1990, 36 states authorized
statewide branching, and only two prohibited it. Second, in the early 1980s,
states began passing laws allowing bank holding companies from other states    
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to purchase banks within their borders. North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia did so in 1985 and 1986. By 1990, all but four states allowed at
least some cross-border purchases. With this change, bank holding companies
gained the ability to purchase banks outside of their headquarters’ states, al-
though they were required to operate these interstate acquisitions as separate
banks—so interstate branching, for the most part, was still not possible. These
two steps broadened in-state and interstate expansion opportunities markedly,
and sizable banking companies began to form. As you will recall, it was during
this period that NCNB in North Carolina began to grow rapidly, purchasing
banks throughout the Southeast and Texas, and ultimately renaming itself Na-
tionsBank.
In short, the consolidation of the banking industry was well under way
when the third step was taken: passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
Act of 1994, which ﬁnally eliminated interstate banking restrictions. This his-
toric legislation gave banks the right to have branches nationwide and set the
stage for the dramatic acceleration in merger activity here and elsewhere during
the past two years.
2. EXPLAINING THE MERGER WAVE
Certainly the current merger wave would have been impossible without the
elimination of branching restrictions, and at one level it is tempting to con-
clude that their removal explains the large number of consolidations. But state
legislatures and the U.S. Congress were simply responding to pressures from
banks wishing to pursue mergers. Consequently, rather than telling us what is
driving the mergers, the easing of branching restrictions—while an essential
precondition—simply begs the question.
One popular hypothesis is that individual banks merge in order to increase
their market power, and it is true that national market shares have been steadily
increasing in banking. The top ten banking ﬁrms increased their aggregate share
from 22 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 1997, while the ﬁve largest banks
have almost doubled their share. But banking is still relatively fragmented
nationally and is much less concentrated than many other major industries.
Consider, for example, the soft drink and automobile industries. Both are far
more concentrated than the banking industry, with the top two soft drink ﬁrms
holding 74 percent of the market and the top three automakers controlling 71
percent. Yet most would agree that there is intense competition in these two
industries.
More importantly, banking is still predominantly a local service, and mea-
sures of concentration at the local level have been virtually constant for the
last two decades, even as the industry has consolidated nationally. The reason
is that mergers have generally occurred across local markets rather than within   
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them—no accident, given that federal bank regulators scrutinize every bank
merger for its effects on local concentration. Additionally, as long as new bank
entry into particular local markets is largely unrestricted, competition should
prevent abuses of market power and ensure consumer choice. In the last ﬁve
years almost 670 new banks have been chartered throughout the United States,
which has intensiﬁed competition in many markets. Closer to home, in North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, 50 such banks have formed. In these
circumstances it seems unlikely that the recent spate of bank mergers has been
motivated in any material way by expectations of enhanced, exploitable market
power.
So what is driving the merger wave? In brief it seems to me that the extra-
ordinary advance in communications and data processing technology over the
last two decades is the single most important underlying force—hardly an orig-
inal insight but a powerful one. A prime example is the database-management
software for mainframe computers that automated the recordkeeping that is
the core of the banking business. The development of personal computers and
the software that manages networks made it possible for banks to provide
widespread access to their records at branches and automated teller machines
(ATMs). Cost savings came as these advances were exploited to manage infor-
mation databases far less expensively and more efﬁciently. A key point here
is that these cost savings accrue most signiﬁcantly in the management of very
large databases: in sharing information among a large number of users and
over wide distances. In other words, the beneﬁts of the technology revolution
accrue most fully to very large-scale banks. The ability to share customer and
product information via computer networks has greatly lowered the cost of
maintaining far-ﬂung branches and of operating centralized call centers. All
this has increased the relative advantage of being a big bank. More narrowly—
but also on a technology note—some recent mergers may have been motivated
in part by the desire of some banks to share the costs of Year 2000 compliance.
It seems clear then that technology is the fundamental force driving the
merger wave. At ﬁrst glance, this force and the consolidation that has resulted
from it appears to have picked winners and losers rather arbitrarily. Charlotte
becomes a major national banking center while Richmond loses most of its
larger independent ﬁnancial institutions. As I noted a minute ago, however,
North Carolina permitted statewide branching well before most other states,
and it seems clear in retrospect that this circumstance played at least some role
in the emergence of the state as a banking center. Beyond the direct effect of
consolidation on particular states and cities, however, keep in mind that the
technological advances I have just described in conjunction with the demise
of branching restrictions has greatly increased potential banking competition—
and the beneﬁts that result from it—in all local markets, including Richmond.
It is now not only legally permissible but operationally feasible for any bank in
the United States to establish a presence in Richmond, or, for that matter,    
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Charlottesville, Farmville, or Lexington. Local competition should increase
even while the national banking industry consolidates.
3. RESPONDING TO ANXIETIES
While technological progress and heightened competition are typically thought
to be good for consumers, the banking merger trend has been greeted with
anxiety by many if not most Americans. Recent attention has focused on three
such fears: diminished service, higher fees, and decreased credit availability—
particularly for small businesses.
Diminished Service
When a bank is taken over, its customers often complain that the quality of ser-
vice is not what they had come to expect from their old bank. And this may well
be true for at least two reasons. First, the mix and pricing of products is likely
to change with the merger, so customers preferring the old product mix will
be less satisﬁed. The economies of scale that make large banks cost-effective
depend on the standardization of products and service. Without standardization
the information sharing that drives mergers would be inefﬁcient at best. And
cost savings would be lost if, with each merger, the acquirer added a new set of
products or different versions of the same product. But this standardization can
be a signiﬁcant minus to customers who are accustomed to tailored services
and want them to continue.
Second, as ﬁrms grow in size there occurs a natural numbing effect on
service quality and initiative. A big-box retailer cannot offer the individualized
service of the small retailer. Because the larger store’s employees are respon-
sible for a much broader line of products, they likely do not have the intimate
knowledge of each product that is often found in smaller, more specialized
shops. As banks merge into larger companies, there are similar results.
In today’s more competitive market, however, many banks are eager to
provide the antidote to standardized banking. New community banks are form-
ing at an increasing rate here and elsewhere. Many of these banks enter a
market precisely to capitalize on the shortage of “high-touch” banking created
by recent consolidations and aggressively pursue the dissatisﬁed customers of
merged institutions. These smaller banks can tailor products and service levels
speciﬁcally to the demands of these customers.
Before the current merger wave, banks were relatively protected from com-
petition and set service levels to appeal to the average customer. But today’s
open competition is forcing banks to differentiate themselves by service level.
Large banks exploit the economies of large-scale production of standardized,
“low-touch” banking. High-touch community banks focus on high-quality tai-
lored services.    
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The additional choices in the new environment will almost certainly im-
prove consumer well-being. Consumers will have more options from which to
choose: high-touch community banks, on the one hand, and, on the other, large
megabanks that offer less tailored services but a wide array of cost-effective
products in a wide variety of locations. Although the number of banking or-
ganizations has declined by 42 percent since 1980, the number of banking
ofﬁces has increased by 35 percent. This means that even after accounting for
population growth, the number of banking ofﬁces per capita has increased by
almost 15 percent. In the aggregate the banking industry has been expanding
services even while consolidating.
Having said all this, it is certainly true that in the transition to the new
banking structure some customers will be adversely affected by the disruption of
established banking relationships. Suppose, for example, that you are a 70-year-
old, high-balance customer or a small business, accustomed to a high-service
banking relationship focused speciﬁcally on your needs. When a large bank
with a very different approach to customer service buys the smaller bank you
have dealt with for years, your initial reaction very likely will be dissatisfaction
with the merger results. In the worst-case scenario, you may face the costs and
inconvenience of switching your account to a bank that offers more personal-
ized or company-speciﬁc services. Such costs are regrettable. The bright side
is that they should prove to be temporary stumbling blocks in the transition to
more robustly competitive banking markets.
High Fees
Attention has also been directed at the new or higher fees some customers must
now pay for some banking services, which has led many to believe that the
new merged banks charge unreasonably high fees. Clearly, banks have become
more aggressive in their assessment of service charges and fees over the last
decade, and big banks have moved to increase these charges sooner than smaller
banks. Service charges on deposits as a percentage of deposits have risen by
42 percent for all banks and by 67 percent for the largest.
But I’m suspicious of the notion that banks in today’s highly competitive
banking environment can get away with charging fees signiﬁcantly out-of-line
with costs. My guess is that many of the fees have resulted from an unbundling
of services: that is, charging explicitly for particular services rather than pro-
viding a bundle of services to all customers at one price. Customers who are
more costly to serve are now charged higher fees, which allows lower-cost cus-
tomers to be charged lower fees than would otherwise be possible. In the less
competitive banking market of the past, banks covered most of their costs via
their interest margin rather than by charging fees. They paid below-market rates
of interest for deposits but invested them at market rates. They compensated
depositors for the low deposit rates by offering them a largely undifferentiated  
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bundle of free services. Before the early 1980s, ceilings on deposit interest rates
reinforced this arrangement. But equal service levels for all customers meant
that high-balance customers were often subsidizing low-balance customers.
This comfortable world of cross-subsidies and minimal fees is no longer
sustainable. Competition between banks intensiﬁed in the early 1980s as in-
terest rate ceilings were removed and branching restrictions fell. Competition
between banks and other ﬁnancial institutions also intensiﬁed as nonbanks like
Merrill Lynch offered market interest rates to attract depositors traditionally
served by banks, especially higher-balance customers. Banks were forced to
begin differentiating among customers, charging fees and varying interest rates
according to customer balances and activity. Over time, this shift to matching
interest payments and fees more closely to the costs of serving customers should
result in a more efﬁcient and equitable banking system. It will reduce cross-
subsidies and encourage the industry to devote more resources to producing
the most highly valued services. In many respects the greater incidence of
fees so widely attributed to mergers is merely an acceleration of this already
well-established trend.
Of all the new bank fees, none has received more attention than ATM
fees, which some critics have called “unconscionable” and “outrageous.” In
fact, though, ATM fees, like other bank fees, appear to be an example of
unbundling. Users are now required to pay for the convenience of this costly
service. When a bank charges no speciﬁc fees for ATM use, customers who
make little or no use of the machines subsidize other customers who are fre-
quent users. Similarly, if customers of other banks pay smaller fees or no fees
for ATM use, then customers of banks with extensive ATM networks subsidize
noncustomers. Arguments like these are of little interest to ATM users who
are accustomed to inexpensive or free access, and Senate Banking Committee
Chairman D’Amato has introduced legislation that would ban certain fees. Most
observers expect the fees to remain in place, however, which will encourage
the installation of additional machines and promote the added customer conve-
nience that accompanies them.
Unbundling, however, has also produced fallout beyond the dissatisfaction
with ATM fees. When banking was less competitive, it had a public utility
aspect—offering wide payments system access to all customers at the same
price, while inevitably subsidizing some customers at the expense of others.
As heavy competition eliminates cross-subsidies and rationalizes pricing, low-
balance customers, in particular low-income individuals and households, are
experiencing price increases. A backlash has developed and produced calls for
federal legislation requiring the provision of low-fee accounts to small-balance
depositors. No such action has been taken to date, but this issue is likely to
receive further attention in the period ahead.   
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Credit Availability
Finally on the list of anxieties produced by the merger wave, some observers
worry that the trend could adversely affect the availability of credit, particu-
larly for small businesses. Smaller banks are a primary source of small-business
credit. As large banks absorb small banks, who will make small-business loans?
Again, technology and competition are forcing banks to specialize in the
way they serve customers, including small-business borrowers. Large banks, for
the most part, are not abandoning small business. Rather, they are now offering
small businesses a menu of standardized, quick-turnaround loan products. Be-
cause of the cost advantage in offering homogeneous products, large banks are
likely to dominate such lending. These plain-vanilla loans have features that
will suit many small businesses quite well. They offer speed: credit-scoring soft-
ware accelerates creditworthiness decisions and loans can be approved within
24 hours. They offer convenience: loan applications can be made over the
phone or, in some cases, over the Web, representing the ultimate in “low-
touch” lending. They offer low interest rates: because these providers must
compete with other large lenders offering similar products, rates are low. And
ﬁnally they are amenable to comparison-shopping: standardized loan products
vary little and are offered by many banks, so comparisons are easy to make.
Notwithstanding these attributes, standardized loans obviously are less suit-
able for small-business borrowers that require ﬁnancial products tailored to their
unique circumstances. Community banks retain an advantage over large banks
in serving these customers, since smaller banks enjoy short lines of communi-
cation between lending ofﬁcers and borrowing company owners and managers.
This close communication permits community banks to customize products and
employ borrower information in ways that large bank reporting and monitoring
systems cannot easily accommodate. Three types of small-business borrowers
can be expected to gravitate toward the community banks: (1) those lacking
complete ﬁnancial histories because of the newness of their operations or the
uniqueness of their product; (2) those for whom the information needed to de-
termine their creditworthiness is hard to summarize numerically for automated
evaluation and requires face-to-face meetings to verify; and (3) those who
want detailed and specialized ﬁnancial advice. In sum, we can expect to see
large banks specializing in standardized small-business lending and community
banks in more tailored lending.
On balance, there is an excellent chance that, rather than reduced availabil-
ity, small businesses will ﬁnd a wider array of loan products to choose from
going forward—in other words a more efﬁcient loan market with no loss of
availability. Here, as in some of the other areas I have discussed, the mergers
currently taking place may create transitional costs as long-standing banking
relationships are lost or altered in reorganizations. Ultimately, though, small    
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businesses should beneﬁt from a broader selection of lending institutions to
meet their speciﬁc credit needs.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
You may wonder where the Fed’s main interest in all of this lies. Brieﬂy, the
Fed’s goal and responsibility regarding bank mergers—and my personal goal
and responsibility as a senior Fed ofﬁcial—is to ensure that these changes in
the structure of banking institutions and markets are consistent with relevant
banking law and, most fundamentally, that they serve the public interest rather
than detract from it. So where do I come out on the issues I’ve raised?
In broad terms, I like what’s going on, undoubtedly in part because I
have a visceral aversion to efforts by governments to prevent, regulate, or
slow market-driven change. In my view, the recent bank megamergers rep-
resent the structural adaptation of the banking industry, unfettered by archaic
geographic restrictions on competition, to the opportunities afforded by new
and emerging technologies. While some may suspect that the megamergers
are motivated by a desire to monopolize markets and raise prices, there is no
evidence that banking markets in fact are becoming more monopolized. On the
contrary, the banking industry remains far less concentrated than many others
we consider highly competitive. Moreover, competition has been enhanced by
the recent entry of hundreds of new banks into particular local markets and
the entry of a large number of existing banks into new local markets they
had not served before. Although inevitably there will be costly disruptions of
established banking relationships in the transition, this heightened competition
offers the prospect of increased consumer and business choices among banking
products and institutions, and decreased costs. These changes are squarely in
the public interest. I might note here that I am well aware of the concerns
some local community leaders have expressed regarding the potential impact
of mergers on community reinvestment. The Board of Governors has given
these concerns very careful attention in its consideration of particular merger
applications, and it will continue to do so.
Having said all these generally favorable things about bank mergers, let
me mention in closing one signiﬁcant risk in this trend. This risk doesn’t get
much attention in the media when particular mergers are announced—indeed,
it gets almost no attention—but it is quite important nonetheless. Unlike most
other businesses, banks enjoy what is often called a federal ﬁnancial safety
net, speciﬁcally deposit insurance and access to the Fed’s discount window and
payment services. This safety net serves the public well most of the time.
Here’s the risk: when a bank’s balance sheet has been weakened by ﬁnan-
cial losses, the safety net creates adverse incentives that economists usually
refer to as a “moral hazard.” Since the bank is insured, its depositors will
not necessarily rush to withdraw deposits even if knowledge of the bank’s  
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problems begins to spread. In these circumstances the bank has an incentive
to pursue relatively risky loans and investments in the hope that higher returns
will strengthen its balance sheet and ease the difﬁculty. If the gamble fails,
the insurance fund and ultimately taxpayers are left to absorb the losses. I am
sure you remember that not very long ago, the savings and loan bailout bilked
taxpayers for well over $100 billion.
The point I want to make in the context of bank mergers is that the failure
of a large merged banking organization could be very costly to resolve. Ad-
ditionally, the existence of such organizations could exacerbate the so-called
“too-big-to-fail” problem and the risks it presents. Consequently, I believe the
current merger wave has intensiﬁed the need for a fresh review of the safety
net—speciﬁcally the breadth of deposit insurance coverage—with an eye to-
ward reform. But that’s another speech best left for another day.